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Abstract
Over the last 50 years, consolidation has dramatically reduced the number of school districts
in the United States, and state governments still recommend consolidation, especially in rural school
districts, as a way to improve school district efficiency. However, state policies encouraging
consolidation are often challenged on the grounds that they do not lead to cost savings and instead
foster learning environments that harm student performance. Existing evidence on this topic comes
largely from educational cost functions, which indicate that instructional and administrative costs are
far lower in a district with 3,000 pupils than in a district with 100 pupils. However, research on the
cost consequences of consolidation itself is virtually nonexistent. This paper fills this gap by
evaluating the cost impacts of consolidation in rural school districts in New York over the 1985 to
1997 period.

Holding student performance constant, we find evidence that school district

consolidation substantially lowers operating costs, particularly when small districts are combined.
The operating cost savings ranges from 22 percent for two 300-pupil districts to 8 percent for two
1,500-pupil districts. In contrast, consolidation lowers capital costs only for relatively small districts,
and capital costs increase substantially when two 1,500-pupil districts come together. Overall,
consolidation is likely to lower the costs of two 300-pupil districts by over 20 percent, to lower the
costs of two 900-pupil districts by 7 to 9 percent, and to have little, if any, impact on the costs of two
1,500-pupil districts. State aid to cover the adjustment costs of consolidation appears to be
warranted, but only in relatively small districts.

Introduction

School consolidation represents the most dramatic change in education governance and
management in the United States in the twentieth century. Over 100,000 school districts have been
eliminated through consolidation since 1938, a drop of almost 90 percent (NCES 1999, Table 90).
This longstanding trend continues throughout the country, largely because consolidation is widely
regarded as a way for school districts to cut costs. This paper provides a new look at the potential
efficiency consequences of consolidation. Using a unique panel data set for school districts in New
York State, we ask whether consolidation leads to significant cost savings, after controlling for
student performance.

This paper therefore complements recent research on the causes of

consolidation (Brasington 1999).
While the pace of school district consolidation has slowed since the early 1970s, some
states still provide incentives to consolidate. For example, New York and at least seven other states
have separate aid programs designed to encourage school district “reorganization,” typically in the
form of district consolidation (Gold et al. 1995).

Some other states informally encourage

consolidation through their distribution of building or transportation aid (Haller and Monk 1988).
However, many state governments provide mixed incentives concerning consolidation. In particular,
close to half the states use operating aid formulas that compensate school districts for sparsity or
small scale (Gold et al. 1995, and Verstegen 1990).
The principal policy question raised by consolidation is that of school district efficiency: Can
consolidation help districts lower the per-pupil cost of obtaining a given student performance?
Although scholars do not agree on the answer to this question, consolidation is often seen as a way

to lower costs. As a result, consolidation is likely to remain on the education policy agenda in many
states, particularly when school districts are under heavy pressure to cut costs and raise student
performance. As Haller and Monk (1988) put it, “the modern reform movement is likely to prompt
additional school district reorganization efforts, despite its virtual silence on the question of size”
(p. 479).
This paper begins with a discussion of the concept of economies of size and its link to school
district consolidation. The second section provides a brief synthesis of the recent “cost function”
literature and evaluates the existing evidence on economies of size in education. While the cost
function literature is suggestive, it does not directly examine the impact of consolidation. Thus, in
the third section, we present an evaluation of school district consolidation in New York from 1985 to
1997. This evaluation is based on a panel of rural school districts, some of which consolidated
during the sample period. This data set makes it possible to determine the impact of consolidation
on per-pupil costs, controlling for other factors.

Economies of Size and the Effects of Consolidation
By definition, school district consolidation alters the size of participating districts, and any
analysis of consolidation must begin with a look at the impact of district size on educational costs. In
this section we define economies of size and discuss the possible benefits and costs of consolidation.
Defining Economies of Size
The traditional concept of economies of scale refers to the relationship between average costs
and output. In education, output is a difficult concept to define because educational services are
multi-dimensional and involve the actions of many personnel. The most general formulation in the
literature is to say that educational output is defined by student performance and that this output is
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produced by a combination of inputs supplied by a school, such as teachers, and fixed inputs, such as
student characteristics. Even in this context, however, the notion of scale can be defined in several
different ways.
The focus of this paper and of most empirical research on economies of scale in education is
on economies of size, which refer to the relationship between per-pupil expenditure and enrollment,
after accounting for other factors that might influence spending. This relationship can be estimated
from an educational cost function, which controls for output (that is, student performance), input
prices, and other factors. Economies (diseconomies) of size exist if the estimated elasticity of perpupil educational costs with respect to enrollment is less than (greater than) zero. Economies of size
must be distinguished from economies of quality scale or economies of scope. See Duncombe and
Yinger (1993).
Benefits of Consolidation
The conventional wisdom is that consolidating small districts (in terms of enrollment),
particularly those in rural areas, can result in significant cost savings. Tholkes (1991) and Patten
(1991) have identified five sources of long-run economies of size that seem especially pertinent to
education.
Indivisibilities.

To some degree, education may have the properties of a public good.

Specifically, economies of size may exist because the services provided to each student by certain
education professionals do not diminish in quality as the number of students increases, at least over
some range. For example, the central administration of a district, as represented by the
superintendent and school board, has to exist whether the district has 100 or 5,000 students. While it
is likely that additional administrators need to be added at some enrollment level, the same central
administration may be able to serve a significant range of enrollments. To a lesser extent, teachers
may provide a public good over some range of enrollment because they may be able to teach up to,
3

say, 20 students without a significant drop in the quality of education they provide.1 School
administrators and some support staff, such as librarians and curriculum development staff, may also
exhibit some degree of publicness.
Increased Dimension. The traditional long-run concept of economies of scale focused
on the efficiencies associated with larger units of capital. Larger plants may be able to produce
output at a lower average cost, because they can employ more efficient equipment, for example. In
the education context, the logical plant is the school, and equipment includes the heating plant,
communications system, and specialized facilities, such as science or computer labs.
Specialization.

Economies of size might arise if larger schools are able to employ more

specialized labor, such as science or math teachers. Specialization is linked directly to the concept of
publicness; a small school district could employ these specialized staff, but only if they taught very
small classes or taught outside their area of expertise, thereby negating the benefits of specialization.
The potential gains from specialization may provide a particularly compelling justification for
consolidation in an era of rising standards, with its call for more demanding and specialized classes
at the high school level (Haller and Monk 1988).
Price Benefits of Scale.

Large districts may be able to take advantage of the price

benefits of scale by negotiating bulk purchases of supplies and equipment or by using their
monopsony power to impose lower wages on their employees (Wasylenko 1977).
Learning and Innovation.

If the cost of implementing innovations in curriculum or

management declines with experience, a larger district may be able to implement such innovations at
lower cost, assuming that the early implementers share their experience with others. In addition,
teachers may be more productive in a large school if they are able to benefit from the experiences of
their colleagues. A second-grade teacher in a school with five second-grade classrooms has more
colleagues to ask for advice or assistance than a teacher in a school with only two classrooms.
4

Costs of Consolidation
The conventional view that economies of size exist in education has been challenged by a
series of recent studies on the effects of large schools on student performance (Fowler and Walberg
1991; Friedkin and Necochea 1988; Haller 1992; Lee and Smith 1997). Much of this research has
focused on schools rather than districts, and production functions rather than cost functions. The
distinction between school and district size is important in urban districts, but in rural areas the sizes
of the district and the high school are often closely correlated. The decision to consolidate two rural
districts may hinge crucially on a decision about sharing one high school. The argument put forth in
these studies is that the potential cost savings from consolidation are seldom realized, and that larger
schools lead to a learning environment that hurts student performance, particularly for low-income
students. The research on effective schools, particularly private schools, has provided additional
evidence that moderate-sized schools are more successful at retaining students through high school
(Figilio and Stone 1997; Pukey and Smith 1983; Witte 1996).
Five sources of diseconomies of scale have been cited in this literature (Guthrie 1979;
Howley 1996; Lee and Smith 1997).
Higher Transportation Costs. One obvious source of higher costs for larger districts is
in transportation. To benefit from larger scale, districts generally need to consolidate students into
larger schools. Assuming the consolidating districts are sparsely populated, consolidation is
therefore likely to result in longer commuting times for at least one group of students.2
Labor Relations Effects.

Tholkes (1991) has identified the potentially higher teacher

costs associated with larger districts: “the labor relations scale effect, caused by seniority hiring
within certification areas and by change in comparison groups for collective negotiations, could be a
major source of diseconomies of scale” (p. 510). These costs can stem from several sources,
including the “leveling up” of wages to those of the most generous district. The potential
5

monopsony power of large districts may be counteracted by the increased likelihood of an active
teacher’s union because larger districts are easier to organize. Stronger unions may also prevent staff
layoffs, which eliminates one of the major sources of cost savings associated with consolidation.
Lower Staff Motivation and Effort.

Administrators and teachers may have a more

positive attitude toward work in small schools, because there is less formalization of rules and
procedures; that is, it is easier to be flexible in a small school (Cotton 1996). Smaller organizations
are “flatter” organizations with fewer layers of middle management between the teacher or principal
and the superintendent, encouraging more input from all school personnel.
Lower Student Motivation and Effort. Students in smaller schools may have a greater
sense of belonging to the school community, in part, because they are more apt to participate in
extracurricular school activities (Cotton 1996). Moreover, in a small school, the personnel are more
apt to know students by name, and more importantly, to identify and assist students at risk of
dropping out. Thus, students in large schools may have a less positive attitude toward school and a
lower motivation to learn (Cotton 1996; Barker and Gump 1964).
Lower Parental Involvement.

Parents make a contribution to educational production

by reinforcing lessons their children learn in school and by helping to motivate their children. These
contributions may be facilitated by parental participation in school activities and by contacts with
teachers and administrators. The role of parents is linked to economies of size whenever parents find
participation less rewarding or personal contacts more difficult in larger school districts.

Research on Economies of Size and Consolidation
Given these two sets of arguments, the impacts of actual school district consolidations on
educational costs must be determined empirically. The vast majority of evidence on economies of
size, and, by inference, on consolidation, has come from the estimation of education cost functions.
6

Fox (1981) provided a detailed review of the literature on economies of size before 1980. The early
evidence suggested that significant economies of size did exist, and that high schools between 1,000
to 2,000 students and districts over 10,000 students were optimal.
Fox (1981) pointed out many deficiencies in this research, and studies since 1990 have
addressed most of the methodological concerns he raised. Average test scores are the most common
measure of student performance, particularly in math and reading, although a few studies use
graduation measures. Many studies include factor prices, particularly teacher salaries,3 and five
studies have made teacher quality adjustments, all since 1990.4 Several recent studies have modeled
costs as part of a behavioral system involving the demand for education, and have either estimated a
reduced-form expenditure function (Ratcliffe, Riddle, and Yinger 1990; Downes and Pogue 1994),
or treated student performance as endogenous (Downes and Pogue 1994; Duncombe, Ruggiero, and
Yinger 1996; Duncombe and Yinger 1997, 2000; Reschovsky and Imazeki 1997, 1999). Several
recent studies have attempted to control for unobserved factors, such as efficiency.5
Despite the variety of measures used and geographic areas examined in these studies, a
surprising level of consensus emerges. To be specific, almost all the studies find economies of size
over some range of enrollment. Many studies have included a quadratic for enrollment in the cost
model and have found a U-shaped cost curve for most types of expenditure (Duncombe, Miner, and
Ruggiero 1995; Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger 1996; Duncombe and Yinger 1997, 2000;
Reschovsky and Imazeki 1997, 1999). The “optimal” (that is, lowest-cost) district enrollment is
approximately 6,000 students for total costs, 1,500 to 3,500 students for operating or instructional
costs, and just over 1,000 students for transportation costs. Even for total costs, Duncombe, Miner,
and Ruggiero (1995) found that 90 percent of the cost savings are exhausted when a district reaches
1,500 pupils. For New York State, they found that one-half of the cost decrease was due to
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administrative costs, which dropped from $1,124 per pupil with 50 pupils to $193 per pupil with an
enrollment of 1,500.
While cross-sectional spending regressions can provide evidence of potential cost savings
from consolidation, a more direct and compelling approach is to evaluate consolidation using
longitudinal methods applied to a sample of school districts in which some consolidation actually
occurred. Unfortunately, however, no high-quality evaluations of this type have been conducted.
Quantitative case studies (Weast 1997; Hall 1993; Benton 1992; Piercey 1996) focus only on one
school district, have no control group or do not use statistical controls, and have limited pre- and
post-consolidation data. The best case study is by Streifel, Foldesy, and Holman (1991), who
compare pre- and post-consolidation finance data in a national sample of 19 school districts.
However, they do not include any controls for student achievement, teacher salaries, or changing
student composition. In short, despite widespread consolidations of school districts in the United
States, there exists little direct evidence on how consolidation actually affects school districts in the
medium or long run. This point is underscored by Howley (1996):
In the 60 years between 1929 and 1989, consolidation reduced the number of school
districts across the United States by 90 percent and the number of schools by 70 percent, yet
during those years the number of students increased by 60 percent! The lack of pre-and
post-consolidation studies means that we have no solid information about the accrual of
benefits alleged to depend on school closures and consolidation. (p. 25)

Evaluation of School District Consolidation in New York
This paper attempts to fill the gap in evidence about school district consolidation through a
detailed evaluation of this phenomenon in New York State. New York provides an excellent setting
for this effort. First, New York actively promotes the consolidation of small districts by providing
“reorganization aid” for capital construction and operations to consolidating districts. Specifically,
New York State contributes an additional 40 percent in formula operating aid (“Incentive Operating
8

Aid”) to consolidated districts for five years which is then phased out slowly over another nine years.
“Incentive Building Aid” provides an additional 30 percent in building aid for capital projects that
are committed within ten years of reorganization (New York State Education Department 1999).
Reorganization aid totaled close to $40 million in 1999. Second, consolidation also continues to take
place in the state.6 While more consolidations occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, 12 pairs of districts
consolidated from 1987 to 1995.7 These consolidations are described in Table 1.
Evaluation Design
Ideally, an evaluation of consolidation should be based on extensive pre- and postconsolidation data for both a control group and the consolidating districts, which should be randomly
selected (Cook and Campbell 1979). Unfortunately, random selection is not feasible with a policy
change, such as consolidation, that requires approval by local voters. Thus, systematic differences
may exist between consolidating and non-consolidating districts, which could bias the evaluation
results. These differences could involve observable factors, such as teacher salaries and student
characteristics, or unobservable factors, such as school district management and staff motivation.
Differences in the timing of consolidation across school districts also could lead to misleading
results. Districts could face different external environments right before or after consolidation, such
as differences in the business cycle, inflation, or the level of state aid.
To address these potential threats to internal validity, we have taken several steps. First, we
employ a non-equivalent control group design (Cook and Campbell 1979). Pre- and postconsolidation data on variables in the cost model have been assembled for all consolidating districts
and a control group, which permits assessment of change within consolidating districts across time
and in reference to similar districts. Given that all of the consolidating districts are rural, the
remaining 95 percent of rural districts that did not consolidate during this time period are used as the
control group.8
9

The first two columns of Tables 2 and 3 compare the characteristics of consolidating
districts in 1985, before they consolidated, with the characteristics of non-consolidating rural districts
in the same year. On the financial side (Table 2), consolidating districts spent less in every category
except for central administration, for which the difference is not statistically significant. They also
have less local revenue and more state aid than non-consolidating districts, and pay somewhat lower
salaries. Turning to Table 3, we find that in 1985, consolidating districts had fewer pupils per
administrator, lower property wealth, smaller total enrollment, smaller schools, fewer schools, and a
lower percentage of students going to college. The largest of these differences involve district and
school size. Other differences are small and not statistically significant. Overall, the other rural
districts are not a perfect match with consolidating districts, but they are similar enough to serve as a
reasonable comparison group.
The second major step taken to remove bias in this evaluation is the use of a multivariate
regression method that allows us to control for both observable and unobservable differences across
school districts. We estimate cost regressions, described in detail below, with explanatory variables
that include three different measures of student outcomes, a measure of teacher salaries, and several
socio-economic variables. We also employ an interrupted time-series methodology to control for
unobservable district effects. To be specific, we estimate a separate fixed effect and time trend for
each district and we estimate the impact of consolidation on these coefficients for each consolidating
district pair. This approach allows us to separate enrollment effects from the cost effects of
consolidation that are not related to enrollment.
The estimation of fixed effects and time trends also deals with the possibility endogeneity of
the consolidation variable. Specifically, unobserved factors that influence the consolidation decision
might also influence spending per pupil, so estimated coefficients could be biased if these
unobserved factors are not taken into account. This is an example of a selection bias, in which the
10

unobserved characteristics of the districts that “select” to consolidate may differ from those of other
districts. The estimation of fixed effects using panel data is one way to deal with this problem (see
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999). For example, the selection problem we face is analogous to
the selection problem that confronts someone estimating the impact of union membership on wages.
Workers who select to join a union may have different unobserved productivity than other workers.
Jakobson (1991) explains how individual fixed effects pick up these unobserved factors and
therefore solve this selection problem.
Following Bloom (1984), we take this logic one step further by estimating district-specific
time trends. A selection bias can also arise if the unobserved factors that lead to consolidation also
influence the time trend in a district’s spending. District-specific time trends capture the role of any
unobserved factors that vary linearly with time and therefore eliminate this type of selection bias. In
principle, selection bias could still arise if unobserved district-specific factors that vary in a nonlinear
way over time influence both the decision to consolidate and per-pupil spending. This possibility
strikes us as remote, but we address it by including in our estimation a variable that might be related
to consolidation and that has a nonlinear pattern over time, namely a change in the school
superintendent.9
Empirical Model
Our objective is to estimate the impact of consolidation on educational costs, controlling for
school performance. We begin with the standard formulation of an educational cost function
(Downes and Pogue 1994; Duncombe and Yinger 1997, 2000; Reschovsky and Imazeki 1997, 1999),
in which the cost of providing school services, as measured by school spending per pupil, E, is a
function of school performance, S, which is the output; input prices, P; enrollment, N; environmental
cost factors, M, which are outside the control of school officials; and school district efficiency, e.
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We also add to this framework a consolidation variable, C, to represent the possible costs impacts of
consolidation that are not associated with enrollment change. In symbols
E = E ( S , P , N , C , M , e)

(1)

This cost function can be applied to total spending or to functional subcategories of spending, such
as administration, instruction, or transportation.
This approach has two key advantages over a production-function approach. First, it can
account for more than one performance variable, and it even provides a statistical basis for
determining which performance variables are appropriate.10 Second, it can summarize the costs
associated with all a district’s activities, including counseling, health, transportation, and
administration. Unlike a production function approach, in other words, a cost approach is not limited
to production activities in the classroom.
In principle, several input prices could be included in this approach, but reliable information
is available only for the main input price, namely teacher salaries. Environmental factors, M, which
are also called fixed inputs, reflect the characteristics of the students in a school district, such as the
share who live in poverty. Enrollment, N, could be treated as an environmental cost factor; given its
central role in the consolidation debate, however, we treat it separately.11
The first challenge in estimating equation (1) is that S and teacher salaries, are influenced by
the actions of school officials and are therefore endogenous. As discussed more fully below,
instruments for the performance variables come from a model of the demand for education, and
instruments for teacher salaries come from the observation that these salaries are linked to local labor
market conditions.
The second challenge is that school district efficiency cannot be directly observed. In this
context, efficiency is defined as not spending any more than necessary, given input and
environmental costs, to provide a given level of performance. Thus, efficiency is inextricably tied to
12

the performance variables included in the regression. A school district is inefficient in this sense if it
provides activities that do not boost performance as measured by the variables in S (even if those
activities are worthwhile in some other sense), or if it pays overly generous wages, hires too many
administrators, or uses outmoded teaching methods.
Building on the work of Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero (1997) and Duncombe and Yinger
(1997, 2000), we argue that this type of school district efficiency is a function of a set of school
district characteristics, Z, that influence the extent to which the behavior of teachers and school
administrators is monitored by parents and voters. In symbols,
e = e( Z )

(2)

Because school district inefficiency cannot be measured directly, we substitute equation (2) into the
cost equation (1) and thereby replace the efficiency variable with the exogenous variables that
determine efficiency.12 In symbols:
E = E ( S , P, N , C , M , Z )

(3)

This derivation relies on the assumption that student characteristics, N and M, influence the
production technology (and hence costs), whereas school district characteristics, Z, influence school
district efficiency. This assumption has considerable support in the literature, both theoretical and
empirical, but we cannot test it. However, this assumption is not essential for estimating economies
of size. We assume that changes in N caused by consolidation alter educational costs through their
impact on educational production. Without this assumption, changes in N might also influence
educational costs through their impact on school district efficiency. In either case, equation (3) picks
up the systematic impact of consolidation on educational costs.
This approach to efficiency also leads to a key insight, and methodological challenge, for our
simultaneous-equations procedure. In particular, three of the variables in Z that have been identified
by previous studies are district income, tax price, and state aid. See Duncombe and Yinger (1997,
13

2000). Higher income and higher state aid appear to lower the incentives of parents to monitor a
school district’s performance on specific outcome variables, as identified by S, and a higher tax price
gives voters a stronger incentive to monitor school officials. However, income, tax price, and aid are
three of the key variables in any model of the demand for educational performance, and studies have
used them as instruments in a simultaneous-equations estimation of equation (1). Our analysis
shows that this procedure is not appropriate. Because these variables influence school district
spending through their impact on efficiency, they are highly correlated with the dependent variable
and cannot be used as instruments. Given this insight, the challenge is to find instruments associated
with the demand for school district performance that are not also determinants of school district
efficiency.
To be more specific, we select instruments for the performance variables using the following
three well-known rules: (1) they make conceptual sense as determinants of the demand for school
performance, (2) they help to explain school performance holding other things constant, and (3) they
are not statistically significant when included as exogenous variables in the cost equation directly.
The third rule is the one that has been ignored in many previous studies. Our list of instruments is
presented below. Potential instruments that fail the third rule and that make sense as efficiency
variables are included in the final cost regressions.
A third challenge is that even with appropriate instruments for student performance and
teacher salaries, equation (3) could yield biased estimates because consolidation, along with its
impact on enrollment, may be endogenous. As noted earlier, unobserved factors that lead to
consolidation might also influence spending, resulting in a selection bias. Our panel data allow us to
solve this problem by estimating a fixed effect and a time trend for each district. The potential
endogeneity of consolidation arises because unobserved district-specific factors may influence
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spending or the trend in spending. District-specific fixed effects and time trends capture the impact
of these factors and therefore eliminate these problems.
In symbols, let the subscripts i and t stand for district and year, respectively, and, as above, let
C be a dummy variable indicating that a district is part of a consolidated district. Moreover, let α be
a district-specific fixed effect β be a district-specific time trend. The cost impacts of consolidation
that are not associated with enrollment can be captured by α* and β*, which are coefficients for
district-specific fixed effects and time trends that apply only after consolidation. In symbols,
therefore, our estimating equation is
Eit = E éëα i , βi (t ), α*i (C ), β*i (C )(t ), Sit , Pit , N it , M it , Z it ùû

(4)

Following most of the studies in the literature, we specify this equation in log-linear form.
The introduction of district-specific variables leads to a fourth methodological challenge. To
preserve all our pre-consolidation information, we retain each district as a separate observation even
after it consolidates. However, once a district has consolidated, we assign it the characteristics of the
combined district as a whole. This approach allows us to separate the cost effects of consolidation
associated with economies of size from other possible effects. This approach also requires an
adjustment in the district fixed-effects variables to account for consolidation. Because the postconsolidation dependent variable combines spending per pupil for the two districts, the fixed effect
for each original district (a) is diluted and (b) has an impact on the dependent variable for postconsolidation observations of its partner district. After consolidation, therefore, each district’s fixed
effect is weighted by that district’s share of total enrollment in the combined district just before the
consolidation, and is switched on for each consolidating district and its partner.13 These two steps
are also applied to the district-specific time trend. One implication of this approach is that we cannot
estimate separate post-consolidation fixed-effects and time trends for two districts that consolidate.
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However, we can estimate these effects for each pair and still obtain the impact of consolidation on
the fixed effect and time trend of the average consolidating district.14
A fifth methodological challenge is that the state aid term is likely to be endogenous. This
endogeneity has two sources. First, at least one important aid program, building aid, uses a matching
formula, so that the amount of spending and the amount of aid are simultaneously determined.
Because we do not know the matching rate for this formula, and because we cannot identify other
types of matching aid, we must treat the aid variable as endogenous.15 In addition, building aid in
New York is project-based, which means that a district must submit a capital projects to the state for
approval and funding. Aid will be endogenous if post-consolidation capital spending plans result in
post-consolidation increases in state building aid. To deal with these issues, we treat aid as
endogenous. As explained below, we identify a list of potential instruments using a model of the
state aid determination process and then select the final set using the rules given earlier for the
performance instruments.
For our purposes, N is the key variable in this equation because it picks up the impact of
consolidation.16 We use a quadratic specification for ln(N); that is, we include ln(N) and [ln(N)]2.
This specification makes it possible to determine if cost per pupil reaches a maximum or minimum
at some enrollment level. Consolidated districts are, by definition, larger than the separate districts
that consolidate, and the cost impact of the resulting increase in enrollment can be determined from
the coefficients of the enrollment variables. With the district-specific fixed effects and time trends in
the equation, the coefficient of N is identified by the changes in enrollment that accompany
consolidation and by nonlinear changes in enrollment in all districts.
A final methodological challenge is that capital spending is lumpy, so that capital spending in
a given year is not a good indication of a district’s long-term expected annual capital spending. As a
result, the dependent variable in our cost regression for capital spending is a nine-year average of
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capital spending for each district. We can calculate this dependent variable for every year in our
panel, because our data on spending, unlike our data on the explanatory variables, goes back until
1977. The dependent variable for a 1985 observation (the first year in our panel) therefore is based
on the nine-year average from 1977 through 1985. To reflect the fact that capital deteriorates over
time, we used a 2 percent annual depreciation rate to adjust capital spending.17
The use of nine-year average capital spending necessitates two other changes in our cost
model for capital spending. First, state aid for capital spending in New York State is largely projectbased aid, so the time series for state aid is almost as lumpy as the series for capital spending. To
smooth out the state-aid data, that is, to translate it into a long-run measure, we also use nine-year
average state aid as our (endogenous) explanatory variable.
Second, the use of a nine-year average requires a change in the district-specific fixed effects
and time trends. Recall that these variables must be adjusted after consolidation to account for the
fact that post-consolidation spending reflects the unobserved contributions of two districts, not just
one. This adjustment is more complicated with capital spending because we must also account for
the fact that in consolidating districts, a nine-year average spending variable usually includes some
years before consolidation (when the unobserved contributions of each district receive full weight)
and some years after consolidation (when the unobserved contributions of each district must be
downweighted).18
One striking feature of capital spending in our data set is that it often exhibits a large jump
after consolidation, usually somewhere between two and eight years after the consolidation took
place. In fact, virtually every consolidated district has one or more such “spikes” in capital spending,
accompanied, incidentally, by spikes in state aid. On the surface, therefore, it appears as if
consolidation results in a large burst of capital spending. However, capital spending takes the form
of a spike in non-consolidating districts, too. The real question is whether consolidation alters long17

run capital spending, that is, whether it results in higher spikes or in more frequent spikes than would
have occurred without consolidation. Our model is ideally suited to answering this question.
Data and Measures
Our panel data set covers a subset of school districts in New York State for the years 1985 to
1997. To ensure at least two years of data before or after each consolidation, we focus on the 12
consolidations that occurred from 1987 to 1995. All of these consolidations involved rural school
districts, and approximately 190 other rural districts serve as a control group.19 The basic data
sources are from the New York State Education Department and the New York State Comptroller.20
Measures of student performance are required to ensure that we measure the impact of
consolidation on costs, holding student performance constant. Previous research on New York has
identified three outcome measures that are correlated with voter preferences: (1) the percent of
students unable to reach minimum competency on elementary school math and reading tests (PEP
tests), (2) the dropout rate among high school students, and (3) the percent of students receiving a
Regents diploma, which requires passing a set of demanding exams in high school (Duncombe,
Ruggiero, and Yinger 1996; Duncombe and Yinger 1997, 2000). The first two measures capture the
lower tail of the distribution, while the third is a measure of higher levels of performance.
Accounting for the third variable is particularly important New York, where one argument for
consolidation is that it facilitates the offering of special classes to support the Regents Exams.
As noted earlier, we treat the outcome measures as endogenous but cannot use three key
demand determinants, namely income, property value, and state aid, as instruments. To solve this
problem, we use information on neighboring school districts. We hypothesize that voters’ desired
level of student performance increases with the performance in adjacent districts. This hypothesis
leads to a potential list of instruments for the performance variables that consists of minimum,
maximum, and mean values of our three performance variables in adjacent districts.
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In addition, we need instruments to identify the coefficient for the endogenous state aid
variable. We hypothesize that state legislators are wary of large differences in aid per pupil between
similar districts, because of the implications both for fairness and for political standing. As a result,
our list of potential instruments for the state aid variable consists of minimum, maximum, and mean
aid in adjacent districts; average aid in districts in the same county; average aid in districts in the
same enrollment category; and the interaction between the previous two variables.
In both cases, the role of these variables may be tempered by other comparisons across
districts, in salaries, incomes, property values, and so on. As a result, our potential set of instruments
for both performance and state aid variables also includes the average, maximum, and minimum
value of income, property value, and percent of students receiving a subsidized lunch in adjacent
school districts. These initial lists are pared down using the second and third rules outlined earlier.
No variable was treated as an instrument unless it was significant (t-statistic greater than 1.5) in at
least one of three regressions to explain the three performance measures or a regression to explain
state aid. Any variable that passed this test was still not treated as an instrument if it was significant
(t-statistic > 1.5) in any of the cost regressions discussed below. This procedure was applied
separately to the capital cost regression, so that instruments (and added explanatory variables) in that
regression differ from those in the operating cost regressions.
To capture efficiency in the cost model, we start with income, tax price, state aid per pupil,
and our variable indicating a change in superintendent. Income is measured by income per pupil,
(the inverse of) tax price is measured by property value per pupil, and the state aid variable is total
state aid divided by total income, which we call the state aid ratio.21 In addition, some of the rejected
instruments for the performance variables or for state aid were treated as efficiency variables,
following the rules given earlier.
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For our price variable, we use information on the average salary for teachers with one through
five years of experience, which is a better indicator of the cost of attracting teachers than a measure
of salaries for more experienced teachers. To control for teacher quality differences, we regressed
actual salaries on teacher education and experience, and then constructed a predicted wage for
teachers with average experience and education. Teacher’s salaries may reflect both the required
market wage and the ability of teacher’s unions to negotiate higher salaries. Thus, teacher’s salaries
may also be endogenous. Because comparable private sector wages are not available, we used the
minimum, maximum, and mean wage in adjacent counties as instruments. Research on public labor
markets has found significant spillovers across adjacent governments, particularly when active
unions are present, as in New York (Freeman 1986).
Environmental variables identified in past research include child poverty, incidence of singleparent families, proportion of students with limited English proficiency or special needs, and the
share of secondary students in a district. Because Census data are not available for each year, our
environmental cost variables are limited to the percentage of students receiving a subsidized lunch, a
well-known proxy for poverty, and the percentage of students in secondary grades. However, district
fixed-effects and trend variables control for unobserved student and family characteristics, at least to
the extent that their effect follows a linear trend.
Evaluation Results
Descriptive Analysis.

As explained earlier, Tables 2 and 3 compare consolidating and

non-consolidating districts. These tables reveal some significant shifts in this comparison between
1985 and 1997. According to Table 2, all categories of aggregate spending per pupil were
significantly lower in consolidating districts in 1985 and higher, usually significantly, in 1997. The
shift in capital spending is particularly striking; consolidating districts were spending three times as
much per pupil in 1997, despite considerably lower spending per pupil in 1985. Hence, the cost
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advantages of consolidation, if any, are not visible in the aggregate figures. State aid favored the
consolidating districts in 1997 as in 1985, although the difference in 1997 was somewhat larger.22
Finally, differences in teacher salaries between these two groups of schools also narrowed over this
period, which suggests that consolidation does not have a strong wage effect in either direction.
As discussed previously, consolidating districts in 1985 had lower property wealth, a lower
ratio of students to administrators, and smaller percent of students going on to college. Table 3
shows that these differences remained in 1997 after consolidation. As expected, however,
consolidation also had a significant impact on the size and number of schools in consolidating
districts. In consolidating districts, the average number of schools almost doubled and median highschool enrollment increased by over 25 percent. Fifty percent of consolidating districts had only one
school before consolidation, but no one-school districts remained after consolidation.
One key question is whether consolidation has positive effects on student performance or
retention. Table 3 suggests that the effects are modest, at best. Differences between consolidating
and non-consolidating districts were not significant in 1985, except for a lower college-going rate in
consolidating districts. The pattern in 1997 is similar, with only one significant difference, namely a
smaller failure rate for consolidating districts on the math PEP tests. These differences are consistent
with the view that consolidation boosts performance, but the differences are small in magnitude.
Table 3 also does not support the view that consolidation increases the number of more demanding
Regents courses and hence the number of students receiving Regents diplomas.
Another way to examine the data is by comparing consolidating districts before and after
consolidation. Table 4 shows that, almost across the board, inflation-adjusted expenditure per pupil,
revenue per pupil, and average teacher salaries are higher after consolidation. The only exception is
expenditure for central administration. However, a similar pattern emerges in non-consolidating
districts. One explanation may be inadequate inflation adjustment; we are using a national inflation
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rate that may not adequately capture price changes in New York. Real per pupil expenditure in New
York rose significantly during this period due in part to rapid increases in special education spending
(Lankford and Wyckoff 1996). Table 4 also shows that capital expenditure and operating and
maintenance expenditure rose more rapidly after consolidation than before, but spending for teaching
and central administration grew more slowly or even declined. On the revenue side, the large
increase in state aid compensated consolidating districts for their lack of growth in local revenue.
Cost Regression Results.

The cost models were estimated using 2SLS regression,

with student outcomes, teacher salaries, and the state aid ratio treated as endogenous. Separate
regressions were estimated for operating expenditure, capital expenditure, and selected functional
subcategories of expenditure that do not involve substantial capital spending. Table 5 presents
detailed results for operating and capital spending per pupil. Regressions for functional spending
subcategories include the same explanatory variables and employ the same instruments as the
operating spending regression.23
In interpreting these results, it is important to remember that the regressions include districtspecific fixed effects and time trends. Except in the case of the enrollment variables, the estimated
coefficients are identified only by nonlinear variation in the explanatory variables and do not provide
general tests of the impact of these variables on educational costs. In the operating cost regression,
which is in the first column of Table 5, the coefficients of one outcome variable, the PEP test
variable, has the expected sign and is statistically significant, whereas the coefficients of other two
outcome variables have unexpected signs and one of these coefficient, for the dropout rate, is
statistically significant. The coefficients of two cost variables, teacher salaries and the share of
students in secondary school, also have the wrong sign and are statistically significant. However, the
coefficients of the dropout rate and of the two cost variables are small in magnitude. The core
efficiency variables, state aid, property values, and median income, have the expected positive
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impact on costs and are statistically significant. A change in superintendent also boosts costs, but
falls just short of significance at the 5 percent level.
Many of the variables considered as possible instruments also prove to be significant in this
regression (and so were rejected as instruments). These variables all involve comparisons between a
district and either its neighbors or other comparison districts. As a result, they all have a clear
conceptual link to efficiency because they could reflect comparisons that induce parents to alter their
monitoring activities and school administrators to alter their management activities. Specifically, we
find that school operating costs are significantly related to the aid received by various comparison
districts (neighbors and those with similar enrollment); to the average performance of neighboring
districts; to the average incomes, property values, and teacher salaries in neighboring districts; and to
the average share of students with free lunches in neighboring districts. For example, the results for
two performance variables, the dropout rate and the percent with a Regents diploma, support the
view that the existence of high-performing neighbors puts pressure on school administrators to
improve school efficiency.
In the case of capital costs, far fewer variables are statistically significant. See the second
column of Table 5. Not surprisingly, the average state aid variable is highly significant with a large
coefficient. The coefficient of one of the other basic efficiency variables, district income, also is
positive and significant. In addition, three comparison variables have significant coefficients: aid
received by districts with similar enrollments, aid received by other districts in the county, and
average income of neighboring districts.
Estimated Economies of Size.

Table 6 presents the coefficients of the enrollment

variables for various categories of spending. The first enrollment variable is negative and significant
in every regression. We dropped the second enrollment variable, the square of log enrollment, if it
had a t-statistic below 1.0. This rule led us to drop the second enrollment variable for administrative
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services. In every other case except one, the estimated relationship between per-pupil spending and
enrollment is U-shaped and both enrollment variables are statistically significant. The sole exception
is transportation spending, for which the second enrollment variable has a t-statistic of only 1.44.
The estimated economies of size are illustrated in the last three columns of Table 6 and in
Figure 1. These columns in Table 6 indicate the economies of size associated with three hypothetical
consolidations, corresponding roughly to the types of consolidations in our data (see Table 1). The
panels of Figure 1 plot cost per pupil as a function of district enrollment, compared to a district with
300 pupils that does not consolidate. For now, we want to focus on the thickest lines in these panels,
which are labeled “baseline.”
Panel A of Figure 1 and Table 6 reveal that operating cost per pupil has a U-shaped
relationship with enrollment, with a minimum at 4,699 pupils. Because this minimum point is near
the maximum enrollment observed in our data, economies of size in operating spending arise with
most patterns of consolidation but are larger when relatively small districts merge. As shown in
Table 6, operating cost per pupil declines by 22.4 percent when two 300-pupil districts merge, but
the cost savings drop to 8.0 percent when two 1,500-pupil districts merge.
Results for the functional spending categories strongly support elements of the traditional
view of economies of size. As shown in Table 6 and in panel C of Figure 1, spending for
instructional purposes and for teaching alone exhibit the expected U-shape, with minimum per-pupil
costs in a district with 3,112 pupils and 3,387 pupils, respectively. These results imply that the
hypothetical consolidations in Table 6 result in substantial savings in both instructional and teaching
costs per pupil, particularly when two small districts are combined. The cost savings in the fourth
column of Table 6 are 18.0 percent for instruction and 22.5 percent for teaching. These results
clearly support the view that, up to a point, there is “publicness” in the provision of classroom
instruction.
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The results concerning spending for central administration also confirm the traditional view.
As noted earlier, the squared enrollment term in this case was dropped, but the enrollment variable is
highly significant. Thus, as shown in panel D of Figure 1, the per-pupil cost for these services
declines steadily as enrollment increases. In fact, as indicated in the last three columns of Table 6,
doubling district enrollment cuts administrative costs per pupil by over one third—a sign of
extensive “publicness” in administrative services.
The results for transportation services contradict the traditional view, because they also
exhibit a U-shape, with a minimum per-pupil cost at an enrollment of 11,417 pupils.24 See panel E
of Figure 1. The cost savings from consolidation can be quite large. As shown in Table 6, these
savings range from 32.3 to 18.1 percent for the three hypothetical consolidations in Table 6. Thus,
we find clear evidence of economies of size—not diseconomies of size—in the provision of
transportation services.
The results for capital spending also indicate a U-shaped pattern, but in this case the implied
minimum-cost enrollment is at only 751 pupils. See Table 6 and panel B of Figure 1. Moreover, the
per-pupil cost increases rapidly after this point so that it is actually 43.7 percent higher at 3,000
pupils than at 300 pupils. In other words, we find strong economies of size up to 751 pupils and
strong diseconomies of scale above that. As a result, consolidations that involve two relatively small
districts, such as the one in column 4 of Table 6, result in much lower capital costs per pupil,
whereas consolidations that involve larger districts actually raise these costs considerably. See
columns 5 and 6 of Table 6.
Because capital costs constitute approximately 9 percent of spending in the average district,
these results imply that the enrollment changes associated with consolidation result in cost savings of
22.5, 9.1, and 1.5 percent, respectively, for the three consolidations in Table 6.25 In other words, net
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economies of size are very significant when two 300-pupil districts merge, but quite modest when
two 1,500-pupil districts come together.
Estimated Cost Impacts of Consolidation.

The net cost impact of consolidation

reflects both economies of size and cost impacts that are not associated with enrollment. The latter
effects are picked up by the post-consolidation changes in the district-specific fixed effects and time
trends for each consolidating district. The mean values of these coefficients (along with associated tstatistics) are presented in Table 7.26 Both operating spending and the functional spending
subcategories all exhibit the same significant pattern: a positive upward shift in per-pupil costs at the
time of consolidation followed by a gradual decline in per-pupil costs in the years after consolidation
has taken place. Moreover, the gradual decline more than offsets the initial upward shift somewhere
between the fourth and seventh year after consolidation, depending on the category. Indeed, for
instruction, administration, and transportation, the cost savings beyond those associated with
enrollment reach 19 to 34 percent, again depending on the category, by the tenth year after
consolidation. In other words, these results clearly indicate that there are short-run adjustment costs
associated with consolidation, but that these adjustment costs phase out over time and, indeed are
replaced by cost savings from consolidation that are not associated with enrollment change. See
panels A and C through E of Figure 1.
These cost savings, which are unrelated to enrollment, are difficult to interpret. One
possibility is that the cost savings in, roughly, the fifth through tenth years after consolidation arise
because teachers and administrators are so enthusiastic about the possibilities of their new, larger
district that they are unusually efficient during these years. Another possibility is that these savings
reflect some unidentified feature of consolidation that results in long-run cost savings. Because we
do not observe any districts more than ten years after consolidation, we cannot determine statistically
which of these possibilities is at work.27 However, we do not know of any conceptual basis for
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expecting long-run cost savings from consolidation that are not associated with an enrollment change
or with some change in other observable school district characteristics. To put it another way, we
know of no reason to expect that two otherwise similar 600-pupil districts, one of which was created
from two 300-pupil districts and the other of which was not, will have systematically different
operating costs in the long run.
The time pattern of the results for capital spending is very different, but the net effect is the
same. As shown in Table 7, consolidation results in a large downward shift in capital costs followed
by an increase in capital costs over time. Neither of the two estimated coefficients is statistically
significant. Taken at face value, these coefficients imply that factors boosting capital costs offset the
initial downward shift by the sixth year and result in increased costs in the sixth through tenth year
after consolidation. We interpret these findings to mean that districts postpone capital projects in the
years immediately after consolidation, but then make up for this with a burst of capital spending
thereafter. Presumably, it takes a consolidated districts a few years to figure out exactly how to make
use of its merged capital facilities, but then it has to catch up to its long-term capital needs.28 As in
the case of operating costs, we know of no conceptual basis for a long-term increase in capital costs
that is not associated with enrollment or some other observable district characteristic, but we cannot
rule this possibility out with our data.
These results help us to interpret the widespread appearance of “spikes” in capital spending
after consolidation. To some degree, these spikes represent capital spending that would have
occurred without consolidation and, in the case of consolidations involving relatively large districts,
with capital spending needed to satisfy the higher long-run capital needs associated with a larger
student body. However, these spikes also appear to be magnified by the fact that districts postpone
capital spending in the years immediately following consolidation and therefore must do some
“catch-up” spending when their new capital plans are implemented.
27

Table 7 presents calculations intended to describe the range of possible interpretations of
these results. Specifically, they indicate cost savings from consolidation that are not related to
enrollment change as a percentage of the present value of the costs a district would have experienced
if it had not consolidated. These calculations are based on the estimated coefficients at the top of the
table; in the case of capital spending, therefore, they are imprecise. The first three rows after the
regression results are based on a 10-year time trend, with a different discount rate for each row. The
next two rows are based on a 30-year horizon and a 5 percent discount rate. The first of these rows
assumes that the observed 10-year effects phase out after that time (at the rate indicated by the timetrend coefficient), whereas the second row assumes that the effect observed at eight years continues
indefinitely.29 As a result, the 10-year rows and the first 30-year row correspond to interpreting the
results as short-term effects, and the second 30-year row corresponds to interpreting the results as
long-term effects.
This table reveals that these post-consolidation, time-trend effects can be substantial for
subcategories of spending, but also that these effects are generally small and have little effect on total
costs, regardless of our assumptions about time horizon or discount rate. The most dramatic results
are in the “capital” and “administration” columns. The time trend effects for capital spending range
from –4.3 percent to +12.2 percent, depending on the assumptions. Because we estimate a large
increase in capital costs by eight years after consolidation, holding this increase constant until the 30year mark, results in a significant capital cost increase over the entire period. In contrast, with a 10year horizon and a high discount rate, which down-weights the capital cost increases in later years,
the capital cost savings can be substantial. In the case of administrative costs, we find significant
cost savings, between 5 and 18 percent, for all our assumptions. In other subcategories, the cost
savings in some years are roughly offset by cost increases in other years, no matter what the
assumptions.
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The first column of Table 7 indicates that under all assumptions, the time-trend effects for
subcategories of spending roughly cancel out so that the impact on total costs is close to zero. As
before, the impact on total spending is calculated as a weighted average of the operating and capital
cost impacts. As it turns out, the assumptions that drive up the cost increases in capital services (a
longer horizon or a lower discount rate) also drive up the cost savings in operating services, so the
net impact of these time trends on total costs is close to zero under all our assumptions. Specifically,
the net impact ranges from a 3.3 percent cost increase with a 10-year horizon and a 10 percent
discount rate to 0.3 percent cost savings with a 30-year horizon and the assumption that costs
differences observed in the eighth year continue indefinitely. Regardless of whether the postconsolidation time-trends we estimate phase out after ten years or persist indefinitely, therefore, the
long-term impacts of consolidation are closely approximated by the enrollment effects alone.

Conclusions
This paper goes beyond existing education cost studies by examining the cost implications of
actual consolidations among rural school districts in New York. Our data cover the 1985 to 1997
period, during which 12 pairs of rural districts consolidated. All other rural school districts serve as
our comparison group. Our model is designed to determine the impact of consolidation on costs,
holding constant student performance and other factors, such as state and teacher salaries. To
eliminate potential biases from endogeneity and unobserved factors, we estimate our model with
district-specific fixed effects and time trends and treat student performance, state aid, and teacher
salaries as endogenous.
We find that consolidation clearly cuts costs for small, rural school districts in New York.
Moreover, the cost savings from consolidation appear to be driven almost entirely by economies of
size. Consolidation does affect the time pattern of both operating and capital spending, but in both
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cases, the initial impact is offset by later changes. Moreover, the time-related impacts on capital
spending are roughly offset by the impacts on operating spending. We conclude that consolidation is
likely to cut the costs of two 300-pupil districts by over 20 percent, cut the costs of two 900-pupil
districts by 7 to 9 percent, and have little if any net impact on the costs of two 1,500 pupil districts.
State education departments have played a central role in encouraging and sometimes
financially supporting school district consolidation (Haller and Monk 1988). New York backs up its
commitment to consolidation with a sizable long-term subsidy to consolidating governments, on the
order of $40 million per year. Our results indicate that some state incentives for consolidation
clearly are warranted, but only for relatively small districts. We find no support for the use of state
tax dollars to encourage consolidation among districts with 1,500 or more pupils. Overall, our
results point toward a state program to encourage consolidation among small, rural school districts,
but to eliminate other financial incentives for consolidation.
The consolidation of school districts remains an important issue in state educational policy.
This paper shows how the cost impacts of consolidation can be evaluated and shows that
consolidation can significantly lower the costs of small, rural school districts. This work obviously
needs to be replicated in other states. Moreover, future studies need to consider the impact of
consolidation on students’ commuting times and on measures of student performance other than testscores and dropout rates.
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District-Specific Variables in a Model of Consolidation
This technical appendix derives district-specific variables to use in a study of school
district consolidation.
1.

Definitions

Let superscripts define variables and subscripts define observations. Now define the
following variables.
E

= spending per pupil

X

= explanatory variables

Di

= dummy for district i

i*

= consolidation partner for district i

C

= consolidation dummy
= 1 for district i in year t if district i is consolidated with another district in year t
= 0 otherwise

w

= district weight
= district’s share of total enrollment in its consolidated district in the year before
consolidation
= 0 for districts that do not consolidate

t

= time (1985=1)
= value of t in the year before consolidation
= 0 in districts that do not consolidate

N

= number of districts

M

= number of districts that consolidate

Note that if district i consolidates;
wi + wi* = 1
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That is, enrollment shares for two districts that consolidate add up to 1. Thus,
n

å (w + w
i =1

i

i*

)=M

Note that wi is defined by district, not by observation; that is, it does not vary with t
2.

District-Specific Fixed Effects and Time Trends

Before consolidation, a district’s fixed effect is just its dummy variable, but after
consolidation the dependent variable is the shared spending level. Thus, the unobserved factors
for district i explain only a portion of the unobserved part of Ei . We set this share at wi .
Moreover, the unobserved factors for district i also explain a portion, again wi , of the
unobserved part of Ei* (= Ei ), which is spending in district i’s partner.
Hence,
F1i = district fixed effect
=

D i (1 − C ) + wi C ( Di + Di* );

i = 1, N

For example, consider three districts over six years. Districts 1 and 2 consolidate in
year 4. Enrollment for District 1 is 33 percent of the combined enrollment of Districts 1 and 2 in
year 3. The values of the dummy variables for these three districts are as follows:
District
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3

Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6

F11
1
1
1
.333
.333
.333
0
0
0
.333
.333
.333
0
0
0
0
0
0
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F12
0
0
0
.607
.607
.607
1
1
1
.607
.607
.607
0
0
0
0
0
0

F13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1

Also,
T 1i = district time trend
=
3.

( F1i )(t );

i = 1, N .

Post-Consolidation Fixed Effects and Time Trends

After consolidation, only shared effects are observed and both consolidation partners have
the same dependent variable. As a result, separate affects for the two partners cannot be
estimated; instead, we estimate a fixed effect and trend for each pair.
In symbols:
= jth consolidating pair

j

j1

= value of i for 1st district in pair j

j2

= value of i for 2nd district in pair j.

Now define

F 2 = C ( D j1 + D j2 );

j = 1, M / 2

and

T 2 j = C ( D j1 + D j2 )(t − t*);

j = 1, M / 2.

With these definitions, our regression (with observation subscripts suppressed) can be
written
N

N

M /2

M /2

i =1

i =1

j =1

j =1

E = bX + å αi F1i + å βiT 1i + å γ j F 2 j + å δ jT 2 j .
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We want estimates and standard errors for two means:
M /2

γ=

M /2

åγj
j =1

=

M /2
M /2

δ=

2å γ j
j =1

M
M /2

å δj
j =1

=

M /2

2å δ j
j =1

M

Because γ j and δ j are estimates of the average effect for districts j1 and j2 , these
formulas indicate that γ and δ are averages both across pairs and across all consolidating
districts.
Note also that these averages are not weighted. We want the spending shift per pupil in
the average consolidating district. The w variable is irrelevant for this purpose.

Now let
M /2

F 2* = å F 2 j
j =1

M /2

= å C ( D j1 + D j2 )
j =1

M /2

= C å ( D j1 + D j2 )
j =1

= C,
since D jk = 1 requires C = 1 , and C = 1 requires one and only one D jk = 1 .
Similarly,
M /2

T 2* = å T 2 j =

M /2

j =1

å C(D

j1

+ D j2 )(t − t*)

j =2

= C (t − t*) .
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Now, re-write the regression as follows,
N

N

M /2

M /2

i =1

i =1

j=2

j =2

E = bx + å αi F1i + å βiT 1i + γ* F * + å γ* j F 2 j + δ*T * + å δ* jT 2 j
In this set up, it is obvious that
γ * = γ1 ;

δ* = δ1 ;

γ* + γ*2 = γ 2 ;

δ* + δ*2 = δ2 ;

γ* + γ*M / 2 = γ M / 2 ; δ* + δ*M / 2 = δ M / 2 .

So,
γ + å ( γ* + γ* j )
M /2

*

γ=

j =2

M /2
M /2

=

( M / 2) γ* + å γ* j
j =2

M /2

M /2

= γ* +

2 å γ* j
j =2

M

.

Similarly,
M /2

δ = δ* +

2 å δ* j
j =2

M

.

Hence, we need to add the second terms of these expressions to γ* and δ* , respectively, as
written to obtain the relevant means. Adding and subtracting these terms yields (for the last four
terms),
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ç
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Now recall that F 2* = C and T 2* = C (t − t * ) . It follows that
M /2

A=

M /2

åγ

*j

F2j −

2 å γ* j C
j =2

M

j =2

M /2
2C ù
é
= å γ* j ê F 2 j −
M úû
ë
j =2

and
M /2

B=

M /2

åδ

*j

T2j −

2 å δ* j C (t − t * )
j =2

j =2

M

M /2
é
2C (t − t * ) ù
= å δ* j êT 2 j −
ú.
M
j =2
ë
û

In sum, to estimate the desired average effects:
1. Drop one post-consolidation district effect and time trend.
2. Replace them with

F 2* = C
T 2* = C (t − t * )
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3. Redefine the district effects and trends as follows. The second term in each expression
is “on” for every observation with Cit = 1 .
F 2* j = F 2 j −

2C
M

T 2* j = T 2 j −

2C (t − t * )
M

After these steps, the coefficients of F 2* and T 2* are average effects, and their standard errors
are the appropriate standard errors for the average effects.
5.

District-Specific Variables for Capital Spending

For capital spending,
Eit =

t

1
å [ E ] (1 + d )

t ′= t −8

it ′

t −t ′

,

where d is an assumed depreciation rate for school capital.
Thus, the dependent variable in consolidating districts often blends information from
before and after consolidation. For example, the dependent variable in the first year after
consolidation is influenced by nine pre-consolidation years. Five years after consolidation the
average includes five years before and four years after consolidation.
The use of average, or long-term capital spending fundamentally alters the districtspecific variables, which now pick up the role of unobserved factors in different time periods.
To account for this, we express the district fixed effects and time trends as averages, too.
Specifically, the district fixed effects are
F1i =

1 t
1
éë Di (1 − Cit ′ ) + wi Cit′ ( D i + D i* ) ùû
,
å
9 t′=t −8
(1 + d )t −t ′

where d is the same depreciation rate used to define average spending.
In addition, the district time trends are
T 1i =

1 t
t′
éë D i (1 − Cit ′ ) + wi Cit ′ ( Di + Di′ ) ùû
.
å
9 t ′=t −8
(1 + d )t −t ′
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The post-consolidation variables, as before, apply to pairs of consolidating districts:
F2j =

1 t
1
éëCit ′ ( D j1 + D j2 ) ùû
å
9 t ′=t −8
(1 + d )t −t ′

T2j =

1 t
t′ − t*
j1
j2
é
ù
C
(
D
D
)
+
å it′
û (1 + d )t −t ′ .
9 t ′=t −8 ë

Note that these variables, unlike F1i and T 1i , have many zero entries in the summations,
corresponding to years before consolidation with Cit′ = 0. Not surprisingly, this formulation
increases the complexity of the specification needed to obtain average effects.
To estimate the average effects, define
M /2

F 2* = å F 2 j
j =1

M /2

1
=å
j=2 9
=

t

å éëC

t ′ =t −8

it ′

( D j1 + D j2 ) ùû

1
(1 + d )t −t ′

1 t
Cit ′
,
å
9 t ′=t −8 (1 + d )t −t ′

since, as before, the D’s add no additional information. Now suppose d = 0 . Then for any
observation, the value of F 2* equals 1/9 the number of years in the nine-year period ending in t
[the year for that observation] during which district i [the value of i for that observation] was
consolidated.
Similarly,
T 2* =

M /2

åT2j =
j =1

1 t Cit ′ (t ′ − t * )
.
å
9 t′=t −8 (1 + d )t −t′

Following the formulation on pages 4-7, with these new expressions for F 2* , F 2 j , T 2* ,
and T 2 j , we find that,

38

æ M *j ö
ç 2å γ ÷
M /2
*j
j
÷ F 2*
A = å γ F 2 − ç j=2
ç M ÷
j =2
ç
÷
è
ø
M /2
é
2
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ù
ú.
û

As before, the second term is “on” for all districts that consolidate, not just for those in pair j, the
pair associated with the variable. If d = 0, then this expression collapses to 1/(2M) times the
share of the nine years up to and including t [the year for the observation] during which district i
was consolidated.
Turning to the time trends, we can readily see that
β=

M /2

å δ* jT 2 j −

2å δ* j

j=2

=

M

é
2
δ* j êT 2 j −
å
9M
j =2
ë

M /2

T 2*

Cit ′ (t ′ − t * ) ù
.
å
t −t′ ú
t ′= t −8 (1 + d )
û
t

Those results lead to the following procedure for the capital spending regression.
1. Drop one post-consolidation district-pair effect and time trend.
2. Replace them with:
F 2* =

Cit′
1 t
å
9 t ′=t −8 (1 + d )t −t′

æ t′ − t* ö
1 t
T 2 = å Cit′ ç
÷
9 t ′=t −8 è (1 + d )t −t ′ ø
*

3. Redefine the district effects and trends:

F 2* j = F 2 j −

T 2* j = T 2 j −

2
9M

2
9M

t

Cit ′

å (1 + d )

t ′= t −8

t −t ′

æ t′ − t* ö
C
å it′ ç (1 + d )t −t′ ÷ .
t ′=t −8
è
ø
t
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With this formulation, the coefficient of F 2* is the average post-consolidation shift in
the district-fixed effect and T 2 * is the average post-consolidation shift in the time trend. The
estimated standard errors are appropriate for these averages.
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Endnotes
*

The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Richard Glasheen and
Ron Danforth at the New York State Education Department with the education data, as well as the
research assistance provided by Matthew Andrews. The comments of Dan Black, Thomas Downes,
William Fowler, Jan Ondrich, Lori Taylor, and Doug Wolf have also been very helpful.
1.

Estimates of the effect of class size below 20 students are hard to come by because classes
of that size are not usually observed. Ferguson and Ladd (1996) find that reading
performance is about the same in classes between 19 and 25 students, but declines for
larger sizes, all else equal. In contrast, they find that performance in mathematics declines
continuously as class size increases from 19 to 29.

2.

An increase in school district size might also add to the time costs paid by students and
parents who have longer travel times to school (Kenny 1982). Our analysis is limited to
costs that appear in the school budget.

3.

Riew (1986) includes teacher quality measures rather than salaries in the regression.

4.

Since teacher salaries are set by the school board, often through contract negotiations with
the union, they are in fact determined simultaneously with budgets and outcomes. Only a
few studies (Downes and Pogue 1994; Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger 1996;
Duncombe and Yinger 1997, 2000; Reschovsky and Imazeki 1997, 1999) have treated
teacher salaries as endogenous.

5.

Two studies have employed stochastic frontier regression methods (Deller and Rudnicki
1992; Duncombe, Miner, and Ruggiero 1995) to take efficiency into account in the
estimation of the cost function. They generally did not find large differences between the
results of the frontier regression and OLS regression with regard to the enrollment
variables. Downes and Pogue (1994) employ panel data methods to control for district
specific effects, and they find a statistically significant relationship between enrollment
and expenditures. Duncombe, Ruggiero, and Yinger (1996) include in their cost model an
efficiency index produced using a linear programming approach, called DEA. They view
the DEA measure as serving a similar role to a fixed-effects model, by capturing the
effects of omitted variables including efficiency.

6.

The incentive operating aid subsidy of 40 percent is for consolidations after July 1993.
From 1983 until 1993 the incentive aid was 20 percent of operating aid. Capital projects
may be reimbursed under incentive building aid past ten years, so long as the project is
approved within ten years of consolidation. A number of consolidating districts are still
receiving building subsidies 20 years after the district consolidated. We have school aid
data available back to 1981, and information on school consolidations since 1979. A
number of districts that were receiving reorganization building aid in 1981, were still
receiving this aid in 1997. It appears most of these district consolidated before 1979.

7.

During this period, three elementary school districts, each with fewer than 100 students,
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merged with much larger K-12 districts. We do not consider these districts in our analysis.
8.

Technically, two of the consolidating districts, namely Draper and Mohonasen, were
classified as “upstate suburban districts” by the New York State Department of Education.
However, these districts lie on the edge of a small urban area, Schenectady, and are quite
rural in character.

9.

Specifically, this variable was coded “1” if there was a superintendent change in the
previous two years. A more general way to deal with this problem is to estimate a firststage model for the choice to consolidate in each year and then include a selection
correction derived from this model in the second-stage cost regression. This approach,
which is reviewed in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), is not possible in our case
because we do not observe the characteristics of individual school districts after they
consolidate.

10.

As shown by Duncombe and Yinger (1997), with standard assumptions about school
production, the coefficients of the performance variables in the cost equation can be given a
demand interpretation. Hence, this statistical test can be thought of as a way to determine
whether households place a significant value on a given performance variable.

11.

Total enrollment is our measure of district size; in our sample of districts, this variable is
highly correlated with an alternative measure, average daily membership.

12.

Unobserved determinants of school district efficiency are not a source of bias in our
regressions because they are captured by the district fixed effects, which are discussed
below.

13.

Formal definitions are given in the Technical Appendix.

14.

See the Technical Appendix.

15.

Even if we did know the matching rate, building aid in New York uses a closed-ended
matching formula, and we cannot identify the districts that are at the maximum, where
the matching rate no longer applies.

16.

The size of schools themselves may affect student performance and costs. We calculated
measures of the median high school and elementary schools size in the district and
included them in the cost equation. Generally, they were not statistically significant, and
including them did not materially affect the regression results for enrollment or the
consolidation variables. These variables are not included in our final regressions because
they may be endogenous.

17 .

The 2 percent rate was based on the assumption of a 50-year useful life and linear
depreciation. We found little difference in the results with 5 percent depreciation or no
depreciation.

42

18.

See the Technical Appendix.

19.

New York State classifies school districts into different region and district types, such as
“downstate suburb” or “upstate rural”. The upstate rural designation applies generally to
non-city districts in a county that is not part of a metropolitan area. During our sample
period, 216 non-consolidating districts were classified as rural; because of missing data,
however, only 187 districts were used as the control group.

20.

Specifically, the data we used to construct the panel come from the School District Fiscal
Profile, the Comprehensive Assessment Report , the Personnel Master File and the
Institutional Master File published by the State Education Department. Spending, federal
aid, income, and property value data are from The Special Report on Municipal Affairs
from the New York State Comptroller.

21.

Standard theory calls for median income instead of income per pupil and defines tax price
as the ratio of median to mean property value. These variables are not available in our data
set, but the variables we use are highly correlated with the theoretically preferable ones.
Standard theory also indicates that the income term should be median income plus the
product of state aid per pupil and tax price. To approximate this additive income term in
our multiplicative estimating equation, we divide the aid by income. For more on these
specification issues, see Ladd and Yinger (1991) and Duncombe and Yinger (1997, 2000).

22

This larger difference appears to reflect both building aid and reorganization aid given to
newly consolidated districts. However, our data do not provide consistent measures of the
various state aid subcategories across time, so we cannot directly observe the impact of
consolidation on the composition of districts’ aid.

23.

Regression results for the subcategories are available from the authors upon request. The
instruments for all regressions except the one for capital spending include ten variables for
adjacent districts: minimum teacher salary, maximum teacher salary, maximum drop-out
rate, minimum drop-out rate, minimum PEP score, minimum share of Regents diplomas,
maximum property value, and minimum state aid ratio, and maximum share of students
receiving subsidized lunch. This list also includes the interaction of aid to districts with
similar enrollment and aid to districts in the same county. The instruments in the capital
spending regression include all those on the above list, except the interaction interaction of
aid variables, along with a variety of variables for adjacent districts: the minimum,
maximum, and mean values of aid, the mean values for the three performance variables,
teacher salaries, and property values.

24.

Our results do not, of course, address the possibility that consolidation raises the time costs
of transportation for parents or students.

25.

In the average non-consolidating school district, capital spending was 9.2 percent of total
spending in 1997. The average for consolidating school districts is higher, of course,
because of the burst of capital spending that occurs right after consolidation; this is
obviously not a good indication of the long-run average.
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26.

Our procedure for estimating these coefficients and t-statistics is presented in the Technical
Appendix.

27.

We estimated our models with a quadratic post-consolidation time trend to determine
whether the cost savings turned back toward zero as a district approached ten years after
consolidation. The squared time term was not significant for any spending category.

28.

A district may also have an incentive to “catch up” relatively fast. In order to receive
consolidation-based building aid, districts must have capital projects approved within ten
years after consolidation.

29.

We use eight years instead of ten because we have very few observations in the ninth or
tenth year after consolidation.
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Figure 1: Predicted Expenditures Per-Pupil at Different Enrollment Levels and Different Times
After Consolidation (Compared to a Non-consolidating District with 300 Pupils)
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Table 1
New York School Districts Consolidating Between 1987 and 1995
Year of

Year of

Consolidation
1995

Enrollmenta
690
380
1070

Consolidation
1989

Enrollmenta
250
1360
1610

Cobleskill
Richmondville
Cobleskill-Richmondville

1994

1860
390
2250

Broadalbin
Perth
Broadalbin-Perth

1988

970
620
1590

Cohocton
Wayland
Wayland-Cohocton

1994

250
1640
1890

Cherry Valley
Springfield
Cherry Valley-Springfield

1988

480
250
730

Savona
Campbell
Campbell-Savona

1993

420
710
1130

Jasper
Troupsburg
Jasper-Troupsburg

1988

490
250
740

Cuba
Rushford
Cuba-Rushford

1992

1010
310
1320

Draper
Mohonasen
Mohonasen

1987

1990
920
2910

Mount Upton
Gilbertsville
Gilbertsville- Mount Upton

1991

270
260
530

Edwards
Knox Memorial
Edwards-Knox

1987

290
420
710

District Pair
Bolivar
Richburg
Bolivar-Richburg

a

Enrollment in the year before consolidation.

District Pair
Dannemora
Saranac
Saranac

Table 2
Levels and Trends of Per-Pupil Spending and Revenue Levels
For Consolidating and Non-consolidating School Districts in New York in 1985 and 1997 a
1985
Expenditure Category
b

(Inflation-adjusted dollars)
Aggregate spending:
Total
Total without capital (with debt service)
Operating (all but capital and debt)
Capital spending
Spending by function:
Instructional
Teaching
Non-instructional
Operating and maintenance
Central administration
Transportation
Total revenue per pupil
Local
Federal
State
Operating aid
Reorganization aid
Building aid
Transportation aid

1997

Districts That Have

Rural Districts Not

Districts That Have

Rural Districts Not

Consolidated

Consolidating

Consolidated

Consolidating

$6,516
$6,251
$5,979
$265

$7,236
$6,828
$6,485
$407

*
*
*
**

$11,935
$9,128
$8,255
$2,807

$9,934
$9,016
$8,435
$918

$4,001
$3,680
$2,243
$708
$467
$474

$4,330
$3,952
$2,562
$882
$459
$588

*
*
*
*

$5,920
$5,346
$5,141
$3,257
$528
$637

$5,973
$5,437
$3,380
$1,382
$593
$644

$2,143
$302
$4,261
$2,606
$0
$132
$297

$2,986
$320
$3,891
$2,710
$9
$171
$408

$2,370
$454
$6,596
$2,030
$274
$202
$325

$3,990
$402
$4,918
$2,664
$9
$361
$413

$28,685
$36,103
$48,449

$29,181
$37,023
$50,163

*

*
**

*

Average teacher salaries:
1-5 years of experience
$22,074
$23,557
*
11-15 years of experience
$31,045
$34,529
*
21-25 years of experience
$39,079
$40,845
* Means for consolidating and non-consolidating districts are statistically different at 5 percent signficance level.
** Means for consolidating and non-consolidating districts are statistically different at 10 percent signficance level.
a

Twelve pairs of districts consolidated between 1987 and 1995, and are used in the calculation. Rural districts not consolidating from 1985 to 1997 are used as
comparision. Sample size is 2,747.

b

Adjusted using the fixed weighted GNP price deflator for state and local government purchases published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analaysis.

*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*
*
**
*

Table 3
Class Sizes, Fiscal Capacity, Student Characteristics and Outcomes
For Consolidating and Non-consolidating School Districts in New York in 1985 and 1997 a
1985
District Characteristics
Staffing Ratios
Pupils per teacher
Pupils per school administrator
Fiscal capacity (adjusted for inflation): b
Property wealth per pupil (thousands)
Income per pupil

1997

Districts That Have
Consolidated

Rural Districts Not
Consolidating

15.1
358.0

15.5
425.4

$114
$32,334

$167
$34,318

407.0
427.3
1.7
50%

450.3
539.1
2.3
31%

703
32.2
48.5

1076
30.0
49.1

**

*

Districts That Have
Consolidated

Rural Districts Not
Consolidating

15.3
472.9

14.0
442.0

*

$155
$38,144

$253
$42,002

*

431.7
541.0
3.2
0%

462.4
515.5
2.4
31%

1469
24.4
46.4

1117
25.4
46.3

*

0.2
5.3
2.3
31.1
43.6

0.6
5.9
2.3
35.2
45.6

*

School Size and Number:
Median elementary school enrollmentc
Median high school enrollmentc
Number of schools
Percent of districts with one school
Student Characteristics:
Enrollment
Subsidized lunch (percent)
Percent secondary students

*
*
**

*

Student Outcomes:
Percent of students below minimum
competency on PEP tests (3rd and 6th grades)
Math
11.0
11.4
Reading
10.9
10.0
Dropout rate (percent)
3.7
3.7
College going rate (percent)
17.2
21.8
*
Percent receiving Regents Diploma
44.6
48.4
* Means for consolidating and non-consolidating districts are statistically different at 5 percent signficance level.
** Means for consolidating and non-consolidating districts are statistically different at 10 percent signficance level.
a

Twelve pairs of districts consolidated between 1987 and 1995, and are used in the calculation. Rural districts not consolidating from 1985 to 1997 are used as
comparision. Sample size is 2,747.

b

Adjusted using the implicit GNP deflator for state and local government purchases published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analaysis.

c

For those districts with only school, the one school was counted as both a high school and elementary school in calculating school size.

*
*

Table 4
Levels and Trends Comparison of Per-Pupil Spending and Revenue
For Consolidating Districts in New York Before and After Consolidationa

Expenditure Categories
Aggregate spending:
Total
Total without capital (with debt service)
Operating (all but capital and debt)
Capital spending
Spending by function:
Instructional
Teaching
Non-instructional
Operating and maintenance
Central administration
Transportation
Total revenue per pupil
Local
Federal
State
Operating aid
Reorganization aid
Building aid
Transportation aid

Inflation-adjusted Dollars b
Districts Before
Districts After
Consolidation
Consolidation
$8,129
$7,524
$7,066
$604

$11,977
$9,809
$8,002
$2,168

$4,844
$4,465
$2,826
$985
$610
$566

$2,202
$329
$5,316
$3,115
$0
$210
$337

Annual Percent Change (inflation-adjusted) b
Districts Before
Districts After
Consolidation
Consolidation
*
*
*
*

7.2%
6.0%
5.6%
64.5%

14.0%
7.8%
1.5%
171.2%

$5,715
$5,137
$4,455
$2,575
$549
$616

*
*
*
*

6.4%
6.2%
8.9%
23.6%
9.9%
7.6%

2.0%
1.9%
22.5%
69.1%
-0.7%
5.0%

*
*
**
*
*

$2,300
$391
$7,476
$1,829
$284
$150
$250

*
*
*
*
**
*

4.3%
3.4%
6.1%
-3.2%
na
14.8%
-4.9%

0.4%
6.6%
11.6%
-19.7%
na
7.9%
-10.0%

*
*

5.0%
4.2%
4.3%

1.6%
0.9%
1.7%

*
*

Average teacher salaries:
1-5 years of experience
$24,762
$29,091
*
11-15 years of experience
$33,678
$37,506
*
21-25 years of experience
$42,229
$48,606
*
* Means for consolidating and non-consolidating districts are statistically different at 5 percent signficance level.
** Means for consolidating and non-consolidating districts are statistically different at 10 percent signficance level.
1

Twelve pairs of districts consolidated between 1987 and 1995, and are used in the calculation.

2

Adjusted using the fixed weighted GNP price deflator for state and local government purchases published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analaysis.

*
*

*

Table 5
Cost Regression Results
For Consolidating and Non-consolidating School Districts in New York, 1985 to 1997 a

Variable
Intercept
Log of enrollment
Square of log of enrollment

Operating
Coefficient
t-statistic
12.96937
12.40

Capital
Coefficient
-7.54643

t-statistic
-1.17

-1.28676
0.07609

-5.16
4.09

-4.46139
0.33690

-3.83
3.80

-0.00143

-2.22

-0.00580

-1.35

0.00436
-0.00095

2.48
-1.35

-0.01520
0.00187

-1.28
0.78

Log of teacher salaries (1-5 years)

-0.04417

-2.19

-0.24487

-1.78

Other cost factors
Percent secondary students
Percent receiving subsidized lunch

-0.00131
-0.00010

-2.31
-0.47

-0.00052
-0.00263

-0.15
-1.79

0.33468
0.11669
0.06914
0.00404

1.98
11.76
2.05
1.93

23.12392
0.13058
2.82352
-0.01828

7.01
2.00
6.51
-1.22

-8.951E-04

-6.19

2.491E-03
-6.538E-04
6.060E-06
2.200E-06
-7.247E-04
-8.400E-05
7.798E-01

1.98
-2.04
7.05
3.10
-2.85
-3.40
9.43

-1.550E-05
2.391E-03

-2.40
1.37

0.47791
-0.01484
-0.22063

5.03
-0.06
-5.19

-1.60654
4.19554

-3.09
2.49

Outcomes
Percent of students below minimum
competency on PEP tests (3rd and 6th grades)
Dropout rate (percent)
Percent of graduates receiving Regents Diploma

Efficiency factors
Total state aid ratio b
Log of property values
Log of average income
Superintendant change in last 2 years (1=yes)
Averages of adjacent districts:
Percent of students below minimum
competency on PEP tests (3rd and 6th grades)
Dropout rate (percent)
Percent of graduates receiving Regents Diploma
Log of teacher salaries
Log of average income
Percent receiving subsidized lunch
Log of property values
Total state aid ratio
State aid reference group:
Districts with similar enrollment
Districts in same county
Maximum aid ratio of adjacent districts
SSE
Adjusted R2
Sample size

3.72
0.9386
2747

193.53
0.8201
2745

a

Estimated using linear 2SLS regression with district fixed effects and trend variables. Student outcomes, state aid, and teacher salaries are
treated as endogenous. The dependent variable for operating costs is the log of per pupil spending. The dependent variable for capital
cost model is the 9-year average of the log of per pupil capital spending adjusted for depreciation using a 2 percent annual rate.

b

State aid for the operating cost model is per pupil total state aid divided by average income. For the capital cost model, the 9-year

average of state aid per pupil is divided by average income in that year.

Table 6
Coefficients for Enrollment Variables from the Cost Models and Estimates of Economies of Size Effects,
New York School Rural Districts, 1985 to 1997

Expenditure Category
(Inflation-adjusted dollars) b
Spending by object:
Operating (all but capital)
(t-statistic)
Capital spending
(t-statistic)
Spending by function:
Instructional
(t-statistic)
Teaching
(t-statistic)
Non-instructional
Central administration
(t-statistic)
Transportation
(t-statistic)

Regression Coefficients
Enrollment

Minimum
Cost

Economies of Size Effectsa
From 300 Pupils
From 900 Pupils From 1500 Pupils

Enrollment

Squared

Enrollment

to 600 Pupils

to 1800 Pupils

to 3000 Pupils

-1.287
(-5.161)

0.076
(4.085)

4699

-22.4%

-12.9%

-8.0%

-4.461
(-3.831)

0.337
(3.804)

751

-23.4%

27.9%

62.4%

-1.154
(-4.015)

0.072
(3.341)

3112

-18.0%

-8.5%

-3.7%

-1.440
(-5.023)

0.089
(4.136)

3387

-22.5%

-11.3%

-5.6%

na

-35.6%

-35.6%

-35.6%

11417

-32.3%

-22.9%

-18.1%

-0.635
(-12.837)
-1.598
(-2.013)

0.086
(1.442)

a

Calculation of percent change is based on enrollment coefficients. Estimated cost change from consolidation is divided by pre-consolidation cost.

b

Adjusted using the fixed weighted GNP price deflator for state and local government purchases published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Table 7
Average District-Specific Consolidation Effects and the Non-Enrollment Cost Effects of Consolidation,
New York Rural School Districtsa
Totalb

Operating

Capital

Instructional

Teaching

Administration

Transportation

na

0.183
(8.91)

-0.678
(-1.41)

0.152
(6.42)

0.180
(7.64)

0.232
(4.23)

0.253
(3.83)

na

-0.031
(-4.67)

0.120
(0.54)

-0.036
(4.67)

-0.029
(-3.86)

-0.064
(-3.49)

-0.055
(-2.58)

2% discount rate:

2.2%

2.1%

3.3%

-3.4%

2.7%

-9.0%

-2.9%

5% discount rate:

2.6%

2.8%

0.3%

-2.6%

3.4%

-7.6%

-1.7%

10% discount rate:

3.3%

4.0%

-4.3%

-1.3%

4.5%

-5.5%

0.3%

Phase out after 10 yearsc

1.0%

0.7%

4.3%

-3.0%

1.1%

-7.3%

-3.0%

Constant after 8 years

-0.3%

-1.5%

12.2%

-7.8%

-0.7%

-17.8%

-9.9%

Regression coefficients
Average intecept
(t-statistic)
Average time trend
(t-statistic)
Cost savings with a
10-year time horizon

Cost savings with a
30-year time horizon
(5 % discount rate)

a

The non-enrollment effects are calculated by taking the average intercept coefficient and adding it to the time trend coefficients from the
regressions multiplied by the number of years after consolidation. Since dependent variable is in logarithms, this total is the percent
change in costs. These are calculated for each year and the present value is calculated for the given number of years and discount rate.
This present value is divided by the sum of the discount factors for the same period of time.

b

Since the regressions for capital and operating are based on different models, the estimate of the total effect is based on a weighted average
of the effects for capital and operating separately, with the weights based on the expenditure share for capital (9.2 %) and operating (90.8%)
for non-consolidating districts in 1997.

c

Phased out at the rate given by the time trend coefficient (with the opposite sign).

References
Barker, G. and P.V. Gump. 1964. Big School, Small School. Stanford, CT: Stanford University
Press.
Benton, D. 1992. “A Consolidation Success Story,” The American School Board Journal,
April: 42-43.
Bloom, H.S. 1984. “Estimating the Effects of Job-Training Programs Using Longitudinal Data:
Ashenfelter’s Findings Reconsidered,” Journal of Human Resources, 14(Fall): 544-556.
Brasington, D. M. 1999. “Joint Provision of Public Goods: The Consolidation of School
Districts, Journal of Public Economics, 73: 373-393.
Cook, T. and D. Campbell. 1979. Quasi-Experimentation: Design & Analysis Issues for Field
Settings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Cotton, K. 1996. “Affective and Social Benefits of Small-Scale Schooling,” Eric Digest, EDORC-96-5.
Deller, S.C. and E. Rudnicki. 1992. “Managerial Efficiency in Local Government: Implications
on Jurisdictional Consolidation,” Public Choice, 74: 221-231.
Downes, T.A. and T.F. Pogue. 1994. “Adjusting School aid Formulas for the Higher Cost of
Educating Disadvantaged Students,” National Tax Journal, XLVII: 89-110.
Duncombe, W., J. Miner, and J. Ruggiero. 1995. “Potential Cost Savings from School District
Consolidation: A Case Study of New York,” Economics of Education Review, 14: 265284.
Duncombe, W., J. Miner and J. Ruggiero. 1997. “Empirical Evaluation of Bureaucratic Models
of Inefficiency,” Public Choice, 93: 1-18.
Duncombe, W., J. Ruggiero, and J.M. Yinger. 1996. “Alternative Approaches to Measuring the
Cost of Education. In H.F. Ladd (ed.), Holding Schools Accountable: PerformanceBased Reform in Education. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 327-356.
Duncombe, W. and J. Yinger. 1993. “An Analysis of Returns to Scale in Public Production,
With an Application to Fire Protection,” Journal of Public Economics, 52: 49-72.
Duncombe, W. and J. Yinger. 1997. “Why Is It So Hard to Help Central City Schools?”
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,16: 85-113.
Duncombe, W. and J. Yinger. 2000. “Financing Higher Performance Standards: The Case of
New York State,” Economics of Education Review (October): 363-386.

53

Ferguson, R.F. and H.F. Ladd. 1996. “Additional Evidence on How and Why Money Matters:
A Production Function Analysis of Alabama Schools.” In H.F. Ladd (ed.), Holding
Schools Accountable: Performance-Based Reform in Education. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, pp. 265-298.
Figlio, D.N. and J.A. Stone. 1997. “School Choice and Student Performance: Are Private
Schools Really Better,” Discussion Paper No. DP1141-97, Institute for Research on
Poverty. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Fowler, W.J and H.J. Walberg. 1991. “School Size, Characteristics, and Outcomes,”
Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 13: 189-202.
Fox, W.F. 1981. “Reviewing Economies of Size in Education,” Journal of Educational
Finance, 6: 273-296.
Freeman, R.B. 1986. “Unionism Comes to the Public Sector,” Journal of Economic Literature,
24: 41-86.
Friedkin, N.E. and J. Necochea. 1988. “School System Size and Performance: A Contingency
Perspective,” Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 10: 237-249.
Gold, S.D., D.M. Smith, and S.B. Lawton. 1995. Public School Finance Programs of the
United States and Canada, 1993-94, Volume 1. Albany, NY: Center for the Study of the
States.
Guthrie, J.W. 1979. “Organization Scale and School Success,” Educational Evaluation and
Policy Analysis, 1: 17-27.
Hall, R.
1993.
“School District Reorganization in Illinois: Improving Educational
Opportunities.” Presented at The NREA Annual Conference, Burlington Vermont.
Haller, E.J. and D.H. Monk. 1988. “New Reforms, Old Reforms, and the Consolidation of
Small Rural Schools,” Educational Administration Quarterly, 24: 470-483.
Heckman, J.J., R.J. LaLonde, and J.A. Smith. 1999. “The Economics and Econometrics of
Active Labor Market Programs.” In O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of
Labor Economics, Vol. 3A. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1865-2097.
Howley, C. 1996. “The Academic Effectiveness of Small-Scale Schooling (An Update),” Eric
Digest EDO-RC-94-1.
Jakobson, G. 1991. “Estimation and Testing of the Union Wage Effect Using Panel Data,”
Review of Economic Studies, 58: 971-991.
Kenny, L.W. 1982. “Economies of Scale in Schooling,” Economics of Education Review, 2:
1-24.

54

Ladd, H.F. and J.M. Yinger. 1991. America=s Ailing Cities: Fiscal Health and the Design of
Urban Policy. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Lankford, H. and J. Wyckoff. 1996. “The Allocation of Resources to Special Education and
Regular Instruction.” In H.F. Ladd (ed.), Holding Schools Accountable: PerformanceBased Reform in Education. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, pp. 221-257.
National Center for Education Statistics.
http://nces.giv/pubs2000/Digest99.

1999.

Digest of Education Statistics, 1999.

Patten, C. 1991. The Competitiveness of Small Firms. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Piercey, J.W. 1996. Reopening of Kenton School. Elkview, WV: A Presentation.
Purkey, S. and M. Smith. 1983. “Effective Schools: A Review,” Elementary School Journal,
83: 427-52.
Ratcliff, K., B. Riddle, and J.M. Yinger. 1990. “The Fiscal Condition of School Districts in
Nebraska: Is Small Beautiful?” Economics of Education Review, 9: 81-99.
Reschovsky, A. and J. Imazeki. 1999. “Does the School Finance System in Texas Provide
Students with an Adequate Education?” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Education Finance Association, Seattle, WA, March.
Reschovsky, A. and J. Imazeki. 1997. “The Development of School Finance Formulas to
Guarantee the Provision of Adequate Education to Low-Income Students.” In W.J.
Fowler, Jr., Developments in School Finance. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Education, pp. 123-147.
State Education Department. 1999. “State Formula Aids and Entitlements for Schools in New
York State: As Amended by Chapters of the Laws of 1999,” report, State Aid Unit.
Albany, NY: University of the State of New York.
Streifel, J.S., G. Foldesy, and D. Holman. 1991. “The Financial Effects of Consolidation,”
Journal of Research in Rural Education, 7: 13-20.
Tholkes, R.J. 1991. “Economies of Scale in Rural School District Reorganization,” Journal of
Education Finance, 16: 497-514.
Verstegen, D.A. 1990. “Efficiency and Economies-of-Scale Revisited: Implications for
Financing Rural School Districts,” Journal of Education Finance, 16: 159-179.
Wasylenko, M. 1977. “Some Evidence of the Elasticity of Supply of Policemen and
Firefighters,” Urban Affairs Quarterly, 12: 365-379.
Weast, J.D. 1997. “When Bigger Can be Better,” The School Administrator (October): 38-43.

55

Witte, J.F. 1996. “School Choice and Student Performance.” In H.F. Ladd (ed.), Holding
Schools Accountable: Performance-Based Reform in Education. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, pp. 149-176.

56

